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Uncertain Times*
by David Louis, B. Com., J.D., C.A., Tax Partner
(*This release is based on an article published in Tax Notes #521, June 2006, CCH Canadian Limited) ___________
A recurrent theme in my monthly articles for this newsletter has been the uncertainty of our tax laws. I am not talking about complexity, which tax advisors have learned to live with. The bigger problem is not knowing what the law means – and in recent years, things have gotten worse. One of the biggest issues is vague and overreaching legislation. A prime example is GAAR, which is spawning an increasing number of seemingly contradictory Tax Court decisions. The latest example, which I discussed last month, is the Lipson case[i] dealing with interest deductibility.[ii] This month I would like to talk about the various forms of retroactivity that have emerged.[iii] Eligible Dividends – Some Details, Please One type of retroactive legislation is where we know the thrust of the proposals, but we don’t know key particulars. An example of this is the proposal to reduce the taxation of “eligible dividends”. The proposal, originally put forward by the former liberal government (in connection with income trusts) was confirmed by the new government in last month’s federal budget. We know that eligible dividends will qualify for a 45% gross up and a federal tax credit of approximately 19% of the grossed-up dividend[iv]. We also know that this proposal will apply to dividends paid by public corporations resident in Canada and other resident corporations that are not Canadian Controlled Private Corporations (CCPCs) and are subject to the general corporate tax rate (about 36% in Ontario). The proposals also apply to CCPCs resident in Canada, to the extent that their income (other than investment income) is subject to the general corporate tax rate. Finally, we know that this proposal applies to eligible dividends paid after 2005 – in other words, now. What we don’t know are the details – the ground rules on which tax strategies are based. While a number of provinces have indicated that they will harmonize with federal changes, the Ontario budget states that a decision will be made when details become available, with similar remarks in the Alberta budget. If, for example, the Ontario government were to enact legislation with comparable changes, the tax rate on eligible dividends would drop from 31.34% to just over 23% - about the same rate as capital gains. However, if it doesn’t, the tax rate in Ontario on eligible dividends would exceed 26%[v] (remaining at 31.34% for ineligible dividends). Based on discussions with Department of Finance officials, where a Canadian-controlled private corporation earns both eligible and non-eligible income, current thinking is that it would not have to first “clear out” the ineligible income. While the proposals themselves hint at this result[vi], specific confirmation has yet to be announced, nor have any details been released on how Part IV tax would work under the new system[vii]. This uncertainty makes tax planning tough. Assuming, for the moment, that the federal tax breaks are matched provincially (e.g., in Ontario), tax strategies for CCPCs would change substantially. Consider the following:
However, tax advisors who counsel specific strategies such as these prior to the release of details may act at their peril.[xi] Another example of such retroactive legislation is the infamous section 3.1, which has been the subject of continued professional criticism. This is the proposal that would legislate a “reasonable expectation of profit” test. Department of Finance officials have made conciliatory statements[xii]. While various informal remarks have been made to the effect that revised legislation could be restricted to negating the effects of the Singleton and Ludco cases (notably that income, per paragraph 20(1)(c) refers to net rather than gross income), there is very little “on the record”, and tax practitioners can only guess how the still-secret revisions would affect a specific fact situation. International Tax Another type of retroactive legislation is where we do know the particulars, but the particulars could change. A good example pertains to so-called “FIEs” and non-resident trusts. It is a safe bet that it will be most of a decade from inception to finalization of these complex proposals. Originating in 1999, draft legislation was first released in 2000, and we are now in our fifth version[xiii]. A discussion of the changes along the way would require a treatise, yet the proposals would generally take effect for taxation years beginning after 2002. In this case, there has been a bona fide attempt to ensure that changes that adversely affect taxpayers would be effective only after the date of announcement. Nevertheless, the complexity of these proposals raises the possibility that seemingly-benign changes could have unanticipated and unforeseen effects.[xiv] (Similar remarks could be made in respect of major foreign affiliate amendments have been kicking around since the end of 2002.) I think it is also fair to say that these provisions can present obstacles to various types of international transactions (for example, it is dangerous for Canadians to transact with structures involving non-resident trusts). Is it possible that the new government could have a different attitude toward whether these traps and complexities are really necessary? Of course, the most blatant form of retroactive legislation is where there is no prospective announcement of any details. In recent years, there have been a few examples of this sort of thing, for example, Manitoba’s retroactive reaction to a previous incarnation of a “Quebec shuffle”. However, the more recent changes to the general anti-avoidance rule and its retrospective effect in respect of application to tax treaties and regulations have definitely ramped things up, setting the stage for more of the same. In fact, just days ago, the Quebec government followed suit and clamped down on a Quebec trust mechanism involving non-Quebec-resident beneficiaries.[xv] The clamp down was retroactive to all non-statute barred years. So we now have two rather blatant examples of retroactive legislation. Personally, I expect other examples to follow. In summary, courtesy of GAAR and other broadly worded anti-avoidance rules, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over tax planning; the best hope of taxpayers is that that they won’t “get caught”. Legislative uncertainty also hangs over major areas. And more lately, the threat of out-and-out retroactive legislation has become more of a reality. When you put it all together, it is a bad situation - that cries out for our professional organizations to be more assertive than ever.
[i] Docket.
2002-1862(IT)G. This case
seems to be largely
contradictory to Overs
(2006 TCC 26), a case
decided just weeks earlier.
[ii] Many tax advisors
candidly admit that they
don’t know what to do with
the Lipson decision,
and have very little idea as
to how far it extends.
[iii] For a much more
scholarly discussion of this
topic see “Some Challenges
In Transactional Tax
Advice”, R. Couzin, 2005
C.R. 2.
[iv] 11/18th’s
of the gross-up.
[v]
Assuming that Ontario
enriches the dividend tax
credit to the same extent as
the federal government, the
effective combined
corporate/personal tax rate
would be about 51% this
year, dropping to about
48.6% when the corporate tax
decreases are fully phased
in. However, if Ontario
takes no action to follow
the federal initiative, the
combined rate would be about
53.9% this year, dropping to
about 50.6%. These rates
ignore the “clawback” and
EHT. Of course, the exact
amount by which provinces
enrich the dividend tax
credit remains to be seen.
It is questionable whether,
in most provinces, the rates
will reach the just-over-20%
target rate envisioned in
the November announcement.
[vi] Budget Resolution 20(c)(i) indicates that a Canadian-resident corporation that would “generally” otherwise not be able to pay an eligible dividend, but that has received an eligible dividend, will be permitted to pay an eligible dividend to the extent of the eligible dividend it has received. Budget Resolution 20(c)(ii) indicates that a corporation that would “generally” otherwise be able to pay an eligible dividend, but that has received an ineligible dividend from a Canadian-resident corporation, must first pay the ineligible dividend, to the extent of the ineligible dividend it has received. Apparently, the first Resolution is intended to apply to Canadian-controlled private corporations - i.e., which are “generally” not able to pay an eligible dividend, whereas the second applies to public and other corporations that are not CCPCs (e.g., a corporation controlled by non-residents) – which are “generally” able to pay an eligible dividend. The latter proposal is intended to prevent, for example, a public company taking over a CCPC and then receiving dividends from it, which are passed out as eligible dividends.
[vii] Current thinking is that, for CCPCs, the primary “tracking mechanism” for eligible dividends will be to measure eligible income, whereas the general regime for public corporations and the like is that dividends will generally qualify regardless of source. It would therefore appear, for example, that dividends paid out of exempt surplus would have different results under the two regimes. Also, while the budget did not restrict eligible dividends to post-2005 income (as some advisors had speculated), the extent to which pre-2006 income will be recognized may still be under consideration.
[viii] See note above
for combined
personal/corporate rates in
Ontario.
[ix] Under pre-budget
rules, the combined
personal/corporate tax rate
in Ontario is just over 56%.
[x] However, a
corporate-level disposition
may still bump the cost base
of the property in question
including the possibility of
increasing future
allowances, subject to
applicable cost base
“grinds” in respect of
non-arm’s length transfers.
[xi] As older practitioners are aware, where a surplus system is involved, the rules can get quite complicated. This could especially be the case when dealing with something so close to the core of private company tax planning. Just a few questions that come to mind include how eligible dividends will mesh with deemed dividend provisions; whether there should be restrictions on trading/streaming of eligible dividend accounts; whether there should be special rates of non-resident withholding tax, and if not, whether this will come up in treaty negotiations, etc.
[xii] Included in the 2005
federal budget.
[xiii] Not counting the
initial proposals in the
1999 federal budget.
[xiv] The analysis of
these proposals has now
become an essential part of
cross-border planning; for
example, fundamental issues
could arise where a U.S.
resident emigrates to
Canada, or a Canadian is a
beneficiary of a U.S. trust
or will. [xv] The trust would pay out all of its income to the non-Quebec beneficiaries and make a federal-only designation to tax income in the hands of the trust. As the trust would not make the equivalent designation in Quebec, there would be no income for Quebec tax purposes; the non-Quebec beneficiary would not pay tax in his or her home province.
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